Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem

Abstract

In this paper I will argue that Aristotle's position on the mind-body problem is probably best characterized as dualism. The question of whether dualism is true divides into three questions: Are there immaterial, non-physical substances? Are there non-physical mental events? Are there non-physical mental properties? Since Aristotle's position is clearer with regard to the first two issues than the third, I will confine the discussion to an examination of Aristotle's position on those questions. Section I deals with Aristotle's commitments in relation to the question about substance and section II deals with the issue in relation to events. An alternative account of Aristotle's position on the second issue is examined and rejected in section III. I will argue that, with reservations, it is plausible to say that Aristotle accepts the existence of non-physical substances. On the question of mental events, I will argue that Aristotle's position is at odds with both the dualist and the physicalist views, but since in this case too it is plausible to say that Aristotle accepts the existence of non-physical events, his overall position is best classified as dualist. The evidence drawn on occurs largely in the comparatively neglected first book of De Anima. Many have thought, correctly, that Aristotle's views on the intellect commit him to some sort of dualism with regard to the rational soul, but reject this as an accurate representation of his position for other types of soul sensitive, nutritive, etc. My argument in section 1 rests on no assumptions about the soul peculiar to the intellect. Aristotle's dualism regarding the soul holds for any kind of soul, including the souls of plants. However, section II deals only with psychic events which have the soul as a subject. Digestion and other actualizations of the nutritive soul are not mental events because the proper subject of digestion, for example, is the body alone.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 95 citations exist upstream.