Oligopolistic Behavior by Public Agencies in International Trade: The World Wheat Market

Philip L. Paarlberg · Philip C. Abbott

72 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics

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Economics of Agriculture and Food Markets Agricultural economics and policies Global trade and economics

Abstract

Abstract A model of the world wheat market is presented which treats public policies as endogenous. The oligopolistic nature of international wheat trade is captured by assuming policy makers form conjectures on the slope of the excess demand function they face and use that information to determine domestic and trade policies. The policies reflect differing influences of political interest groups. A U.S. crop shortfall scenario illustrates the different results with endogenous policies compared to the traditional model.

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References

1981Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures 2016The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff 1961ON A CLASS OF PREFERENCE FIELDS 1982Political Economic Markets: PERTs and PESTs in Food and Agriculture 1966A Duopoly Model of World Wheat Pricing 1983Endogenous Price Policies and International Wheat Prices 1974Estimation of Policy Preference Functions: An Application to U.S. Beef Import Quotas 1978Oligopoly Pricing in the World Wheat Market

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