Article2005

Estimating the Value of Proposal Power

140 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Electoral Systems and Political Participation Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models: members with proposal power -- those sitting on the transportation authorization committee -- secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisan models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers.

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References

1989Bargaining in Legislatures 1999Bargaining Theory with Applications 2002Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach 2000Comparative Politics and Public Finance 1987Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures 2002Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States 1996Buying Supermajorities 2002Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program

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