Article2002

The Constitutional Position of an Independent Central Bank

34 citations0/0 files storedGovernment and Opposition

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Judicial and Constitutional Studies Commonwealth, Australian Politics and Federalism

Abstract

In 1989 The Reserve Bank Of New Zealand Act Gave The Rbnz the operational independence to vary monetary instruments, in particular to control the level of short-term money market rates, in such a way as to hold inf lation within a stated range over a stated period of time. That numerical range and period were to be agreed in a contractual arrangement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor, and the Governor was to be held personally responsible for achieving those agreed objectives.

Citations in this library

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References

1997Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets 1989On Money as a Medium of Exchange 1999Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule 1999Inflation targeting: lessons from the international experience 1993A search-theoretic approach to monetary economics 2012Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context 1995The Central Bank and the Financial System 1995The Future of Central Banking

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