Politics of Intraexecutive Conflict in Semipresidential Regimes in Eastern Europe

Abstract

This article analyzes the patterns of intraexecutive conflict and cooperation in East European democracies that adopted semipresidential constitutional frameworks. It explores how the coexistence of popularly elected presidents and prime ministers is shaped by constitutional provisions, parliamentary fragmentation, and party system characteristics. The article emphasizes a critical role that party systems play in the evolution of intraexecutive relations across the region. It argues that variations in the political status of the cabinet, in the character of parliamentary composition, and in the constitutional powers of the president affect both the type and frequency of intraexecutive conflict experienced by semipresidential regimes.

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