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Auction design with costly preference elicitation · Study

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ArticleAuction design with costly preference elicitation

David C. Parkes2005

Article2005

Auction design with costly preference elicitation

David C. Parkes

78 citations·0/0 files stored·Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

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Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 78 citations exist upstream.

References

1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding 1973Incentives in Teams 1971Multipart pricing of public goods 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result 1997Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Marketplaces 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design 1997Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green

Cited by

2008Information in Mechanism Design 2007Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication 2008Multi-item Vickrey–Dutch auctions 2004Ascending price Vickrey auctions 2004Regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty 2009On the Computational Power of Demand Queries 2005Combinatorial auctions for electronic business 2005ICE

Details

Year2005

Typearticle

Published2005-07-01

VenueAnnals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence

ISSN-L1012-2443

Languageen

Citations78

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

Identifiers

doi10.1007/s10472-005-4692-y

openalex_workW1970574540

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