Risk-Averse Rent Seeking With Shared Rents

Ngo Van Long · Neil Vousden

100 citations0/0 files storedThe Economic Journal

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Auction Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Game Theory and Voting Systems

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Ngo Van Long, Neil Vousden; Risk-Averse Rent Seeking With Shared Rents, The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 388, 1 December 1987, Pages 971–985, https:/

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References

2008The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society 1967THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS, MONOPOLIES, AND THEFT 1996The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods 1974Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation 1980Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs 1987Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders 1988Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power

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2014A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments 1994Modelling rent-seeking contests 1987Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers 2009The social cost of rent seeking in Europe 2007Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information 1991Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules 1995Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking

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