Citation map · Study

SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism1

16 references·3 citing·23 second hop

FromToDepth

this work references cited by second hop

References

1996The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory4,147 cited
1995Naturalizing The Mind2,021 cited
2000Consciousness, Color, and Content1,251 cited
1991A theory of content and other essays1,178 cited
1997Consciousness and Experience1,034 cited
1984Putnam's paradox826 cited
2020Consciousness and Experience714 cited
1989Biosemantics688 cited
1992A Theory of Content and Other Essays670 cited
1981The Mind-Body Problem604 cited
2006Perception and the Fall from Eden585 cited
2004The Obscure Object of Hallucination563 cited
2003Color realism and color science518 cited
1988Color for philosophers: unweaving the rainbow491 cited
1982Quality and Concept459 cited
2003Consciousness and Persons288 cited

Cited by

2012Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation73 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

2006Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?154 cited

2007WITTGENSTEIN AND QUALIA126 cited