Construct the stable vendor managed inventory partnership through a profit-sharing approach

Abstract

In real life, the vendor managed inventory (VMI) model is not always a stable supply chain partnership. This paper proposes a cooperative game based profit-sharing method to stabilize the VMI partnership. Specifically, in a B2C setting, we consider a VMI program including a manufacturer and multiple online retailers. The manufacturer provides the finished product at the equal wholesale price to multiple online retailers. The online retailers face the same customer demand information. We offer the model to compute the increased profits generated by information sharing for total possible VMI coalitions. Using the solution concept of Shapley value, the profit-sharing scheme is produced to fairly divide the total increased profits among the VMI members. We find that under a fair allocation scheme, the higher inventory cost of one VMI member increases the surplus of the other members. Furthermore, the manufacturer is glad to increase the size of VMI coalition, whereas, the retailers are delighted to limit the size of the alliance. Finally, the manufacturer can select the appropriate retailer to boost its surplus, which has no effect on the surplus of the other retailers. The numerical examples indicate that the grand coalition is stable under the proposed allocation scheme.

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