Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 1869–2002

Abstract

When Article III judges conclude active service, they effectively abdicate their seat and enable the president and Senate to select a successor. Some judicial scholars have concluded that political factors—both within and across institutions—largely influence this decision. Analyzing judicial turnover, year by year, this article finds that judges have increasingly synchronized their departure from active service with qualifying for their judicial pension. By comparison, political and institutional factors appear to have little influence on turnover rates. These findings contradict much of the existing scholarship on judicial turnover and also offer more viable alternatives for judicial reform.

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