Managerial ownership, dividend and debt policy in the US banking industry

Abstract

Reviews previous research on the relationship between ownership structure, debt structure and dividend policy within the context of agency theory, which has usually excluded regulated firms from the samples. Explores the links between insider holdings, dividends and debt using 1994‐1997 data from a sample of 136 US bank holding companies and a simultaneous equations regression framework. Finds the level of insider holdings, as expected, is not related to debt ratio but, contrary to expectations that it is strongly related to the level of dividends. Considers possible explanations for this and promises further research.

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