The Relative Value of Empirical Evidence

Abstract

Arguments between adherents of different therapeutic models are often based on the assumption that empirical evidence is ultimately the judge of the merits of the respective approaches. The gathering of empirical evidence, however, is programmed by epistemological premises that in turn are not tested by "objective" demonstration but rather by their congruence with prevailing sociocultural values. The epistemological premises behind indivdual- and systems-oriented models are incompatible, and respectively congruent with currently coexistent and opposite sociocultural values. Adherence to a particular model is thus based on epistemological-axiological positions rather than neutral objective evaluation.

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