Disruptive affects: shame, disgust, and sympathy inFrankenstein

Abstract

Many critical approaches to Frankenstein have relied on an ethical reading of the Creature’s predicament – that he is benevolent within and ugly without. The emotional responses to the Creature’s condition that the novel evokes are illuminated when cast in psychoanalytical light. This article traces how shame and disgust, as theorized by Silvan Tomkins, operate in the novel, and how these responses disrupt or undermine the function of sympathy, as described by Adam Smith. In doing so, the article attempts to show that ethical readings of the novel – readings which participate in both Enlightenment ideas of sympathy and Romantic ideas of the “Other” – remain problematic because of the enduring presence of shame and disgust throughout the novel. The novel remains as powerful as it is partly because of the irreconcilability of the affects of shame and disgust with the ethical operation of sympathy.

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