Stability and Collective Rationality

Terje Lensberg

71 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Economic theories and models

Abstract

A collective choice problem involves a set of agents and a set of feasi ble utility vectors. Many solutions to the collective choice problem (e.g., the Nash solution) are collectively rational, i.e., consistent with the maximization of some ordering of utility space. In this pap er, a stability condition due to J. C. Harsanyi is used to obtain the following integrability result: any solution satisfying Pareto optim ality, continuity, and bilateral stability can be represented by an a dditively separable Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

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References

1950The Bargaining Problem 1951Social Choice and Individual Values.1948Foundations of Economic Analysis.1938A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour 1977Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations 1938A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics 1975Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy.1985Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud

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