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Keynes as a Philosopher
4 references·8 citing·32 second hop
Keynes as a Philosopher (1995)Keynes as a PhilosopherBetting on Theories (1993)Betting on Theories6. A Basic System of Inductive Logic Part II (1980)6. A Basic System of Inductiv…On Indeterminate Probabilities (1974)On Indeterminate ProbabilitiesThe Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959)The Logic of Scientific Disco…Keynes, Knight, and Fundamental Uncertainty: A Double Centenary 1921–2021 (2021)Keynes, Knight, and Fundament…It Is Impossible to Understand Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability without An Understanding of Part Ii of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability: The Mccann-Bateman Exchanges Over Ramsey’s Critique of Keynes of 1992 (2021)It Is Impossible to Understan…B. Hill’s ‘Confidence’ Approach to Decision Making Under Uncertainty Completely Overlooks the Contributions Made in J M Keynes’s Parts II -V of His a Treatise on Probability, 1921 and General Theory, 1936: Keynes’s Interval Valued Approach to Imprecise Probability and Decision Weight Approach Appeared Some 60–80 Years Before Hill Began His Research Program (2020)B. Hill’s ‘Confidence’ Approa…Incertitude, probabilités et esprits animaux (2016)Incertitude, probabilités et …Whither Keynesian probability? Impolite techniques for decision-making (2015)Whither Keynesian probability…Indeterminate Probabilities and Smithian and Keynesian Uncertainty (2014)Indeterminate Probabilities a…The Weight of Argument and Non-Additive Measures: A Note (2007)The Weight of Argument and No…The Varieties of Subjectivism: Keynes and Hayek on Expectations (1997)The Varieties of Subjectivism…Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty (1992)1. Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions (1971)Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. (1983)A ‘soft’ measure of consensus in the setting of partial (fuzzy) preferences (1988)What Conditional Probability Could Not Be (2003)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)A Mathematical Theory of Saving (1928)The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, by John Maynard Keynes (1936)The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. (1936)The General Theory of Employment (1937)Competition and Entrepreneurship (1974)From The Sensory Order to the Liberal Order: Hayek's Non-rationalist Liberalism (2000)Profit Expectations and Confidence: Some unresolved issues in the Austrian/Post-Keynesian debate (2001)The Concept of Mind (2006)Testing Austrian Business Cycle Theory? A Second Rejoinder To Andrew Young (2012)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)Keynes on Probability and Decision: Evidence from the Correspondence with Hugh Townshend (2015)Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics (2003)Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition (2007)Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition (2013)Théorie de la spéculation (1900)Induction, Conceptual Spaces and Ai (1990)Symmetry and its Discontents (2005)Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic (2009)Students' and teachers' conceptions of the nature of science: A review of the research (1992)Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences (1994)Working Memory: Theories, Models, and Controversies (2011)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment (2002)The Affect Heuristic (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1959The Logic of Scientific Discovery2,713 cited
  • 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities548 cited
  • 1993Betting on Theories455 cited
  • 19806. A Basic System of Inductive Logic Part II168 cited

Cited by

  • 1997The Varieties of Subjectivism: Keynes and Hayek on Expectations66 cited
  • 2021Keynes, Knight, and Fundamental Uncertainty: A Double Centenary 1921–202114 cited
  • 2015Whither Keynesian probability? Impolite techniques for decision-making14 cited
  • 2016Incertitude, probabilités et esprits animaux1 cited
  • 2007The Weight of Argument and Non-Additive Measures: A Note1 cited
  • 2014Indeterminate Probabilities and Smithian and Keynesian Uncertainty0 cited
  • 2020B. Hill’s ‘Confidence’ Approach to Decision Making Under Uncertainty Completely Overlooks the Contributions Made in J M Keynes’s Parts II -V of His a Treatise on Probability, 1921 and General Theory, 1936: Keynes’s Interval Valued Approach to Imprecise Probability and Decision Weight Approach Appeared Some 60–80 Years Before Hill Began His Research Program0 cited
  • 2021It Is Impossible to Understand Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability without An Understanding of Part Ii of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability: The Mccann-Bateman Exchanges Over Ramsey’s Critique of Keynes of 19920 cited

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