The Distinction between Interpretation and Application of Norms in International Adjudication

Abstract

This article addresses the distinction between interpretation and application of international legal norms and argues that it constitutes an issue central to the theory and practice of international adjudication. The distinction, though sometimes negated, surpassed or simply neglected, in fact exists and should be drawn by international lawyers, especially vis-à-vis the challenges set by the fragmentation of international law. Ergo, an illustrative operative sketch of juridical reasoning delimiting the two processes in the course of international dispute settlement is suggested by distinguishing between interpretation, interpretative application and application stricto sensu, as all taking place in the context of application lato sensu of international legal norms. The article concludes by turning to the secondary norms on state responsibility and the general principles of estoppel and acquiescence as noteworthy examples of lato sensu application of leges generales in international settlement of disputes.

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