Confrontation in the Spanish zone (1945–56): Franco, the nationalists, and the post-war politics of decolonisation

Abstract

Spain's importance in Morocco for much of her 44 years there (1912–56) was subordinate to that of France, yet Spain managed to carry out an independent policy during that time that corresponded with her continental interests. In the early years, her governing policy in the north was shaped by military concerns, especially during the Rif War (1921–26) when Berber warriors under the leadership of Abdel Krim nearly wrested control of the zone away from her. In the 1930s, Rifian troops fought at Franco's side during the Civil War, winning a reputation for steadfastness and ferocity. Spain managed to seize control of Tangier in 1940, but handed the zone back to international supervision as soon as the war ended. After 1953 Spain's Morocco policy lost direction as the tide of decolonisation swept over the region. Clinging frantically to her northern foothold, Spain played a dangerous game of encouraging the nationalists while trying to stay firmly in control. As independence became increasingly inevitable, Spain courted the Arab League, drawing away from ‘imperial’ France and Britain in an effort to become the ‘friendly’ interlocutor between the Arab peoples and Europe. But when France's withdrawal became inevitable, Spain too capitulated, for Franco's regime was ‘not ready to go to war over Morocco’. Spain's tenure in northern Morocco was marred by a bloody war, incapable administrators, unending corruption, harsh military rule, and the absence of clear goals.

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