Fichte and the Relationship between Self-Positing and Rights

Abstract

A common criticism of Fichte’s political thought is that it is not systematically connected to his idea of self-positing, which would amount to a rift in his practical philosophy. This criticism can be countered through an extensive analysis of Fichte’s view of rational society. This view involves not just a portrayal of the institutions essential to a just society but also an account of citizen participation. The idea here is that social and political progress derives from the people, either collectively or individually, rather than from institutions directly. This idea is crucial to recognizing the link between self-positing and membership in a political community in Fichte’s practical philosophy, because self-positing entails, I argue, participation in the determination of the social order.

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