The Artificial Debate Between Rationalist and Incrementalist Models of Decision Making

Abstract

The notion of decision making is central to studying the way in which policies are both formulated and implemented. This note discusses the relative merits of rationalistic as opposed to incrementalist models of decision making (together with attempts to provide a ‘third’ alternative). It concludes that in certain respects the debate is artificial since the approaches have features in common, the significance of which outweigh any specific points of variance. Firstly, on both sides of the debate the relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is confused and there are good grounds for suggesting that whereas incrementalist models may perform an explanatory function, rationalist models are largely confined to a prescriptive role. Secondly, the debate does not consider seriously the issue of what it takes to act in accord with any set of decision making rules and thus neglects the way in which policy makers and administrators may use ‘decision making’ as a gloss for a wide range of practices. Throughout, the paper is concerned with the implications of the terms of the dispute about different notions of ‘decision’ and ‘decision making’, for policy research.

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