Citation map · Study

SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

The Economy of High Wages: An Agency Problem

6 references·2 citing·33 second hop

FromToDepth

this work references cited by second hop

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
1974Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers1,845 cited
1976The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization870 cited
1978Some results on incentive contracts with applications to education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement.333 cited
1982AGENT COMPENSATION AND THE LIMITS OF BONDING89 cited

Cited by

2005Why do large firms pay higher wages? Evidence from matched worker‐firm data60 cited
2016Incentives, termination payments, and CEO contracting18 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work