levels, for example, the conditions of small experimental groups as a subtype of social system. Only in so far as codification reveals uniformities in the cognate features of many different types of operationally studied system do the more general theorems have a prospect of approaching rigorous empirical verification. This specification should not be assumed to be capable of being carried out by simple common sense; it requires careful technical analysis through a series of concatenated steps. I believe, however, that the theory of action in its present state provides methods for successfully carrying out this specification, and conversely, generalization as well from lower-level uniformities to higher levels. Perhaps the most important key to this possibility is the conception of all systems of action as systematically articulated with others along system-subsystem lines. The basic system types designated here as organisms, personalities, social systems, and cultural systems must be regarded as subsystems of the general category of action system. Each of these in turn is differentiated into further subsystems at different levels of elaboration. Any subsystem is articulated with other subsystems by definable categories of input-output interchange, the processes, in sufficiently highly differentiated subsystems, being mediated by symbolictype mechanisms such as those discussed above. In many respects, this possibility of dealing with multiple system references and of ke ping straight the distinctions and articulations between them, has turned out to be the greatest enrichment of theoretical analysis developed from Dubin's Model II. A flat conception of a single system reference which must be accepted or rejected on an all-or-none basis for the analysis of complex empirical problems, cannot possibly do justice to the formidable difficulties in the study of human action.
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