The role of dowries and daughters' marriages in the accumulation and distribution of capital in a South Indian Community

Abstract

Abstract This article reports a south Indian case of anti‐female bias among the propertied elite in a relatively advanced agrarian economy that is increasingly differentiated. Women have become the vehicles of capital transfer. Expenditures on daughters' marriages have been rising as dowries have been introduced. A discussion of the costs and benefits of daughters to natal households makes it clear that daughters have become serious liabilities. ‘Son preference’ or ‘daughter antipathy’ is reflected in the presence of substantially more sons than daughters among surviving offspring. The article suggests that daughters may be increasingly at risk as the agrarian economy develops. Further research is required to test this hypothesis.

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