The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance

Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael S. Weisbach

1991-01-01articleFinancial Management2,312 citationsclosed

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

Corporate Finance and Governance Gender Diversity and Inequality Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

This paper attempts to measure difference in firm performance caused by broad composition and ownership structure. These two variables are intended to measure the direct incentives and monitoring faced by top management. We also control for a number of otheк variables that are likely to be correlated with corporate performance. We do so to improve the precision of our estimates, as well as to eliminate much of the omitted-variable bias that has undoubtedly affected previous studies of board composition.

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 2,312 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

1983Separation of Ownership and Control

1978Specification Tests in Econometrics

1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

1988Management ownership and market valuation

1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences

1990Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value

1988Outside directors and CEO turnover

Cited by

1996Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors

2003Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

2002Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management

1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance

2003Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value

2007Boards: Does one size fit all☆

2012Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance

1996Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders