Articlegreen2007

An Incentive-Aligned Mechanism for Conjoint Analysis

224 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Marketing Research

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Economic and Environmental Valuation Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

This article specifies, analyzes, and validates a rigorous and practical truth-telling mechanism (game) for conjoint applications. The mechanism requires only one real product variation and has truth telling in conjoint as its Bayesian Nash equilibrium, thus making it possible to incentive align participants in most conjoint applications. Using the iPod package as the context, the author shows empirically that the mechanism substantially improves purchase prediction compared with a standard conjoint procedure.

Citations in this library

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References

1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS 1981Optimal Auction Design 1973Incentives in Teams 1971Multipart pricing of public goods 1964Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method 1994Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?1999The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework 1974Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method (1964)

Cited by

2008Beyond conjoint analysis: Advances in preference measurement 2021Hypothetical bias in stated choice experiments: Part I. Macro-scale analysis of literature and integrative synthesis of empirical evidence from applied economics, experimental psychology and neuroimaging 2019GDP-B: Accounting for the Value of New and Free Goods in the Digital Economy 2011Adaptive Self-Explication of Multiattribute Preferences 2015Consistency between stated and revealed preferences: a discrete choice experiment and a behavioural experiment on vaccination behaviour compared 2008

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