Withering consent, but mutual dependency: UN peace operations and African assertiveness

Abstract

Consent has always been a cornerstone of UN peacekeeping. However, consent in peace operations is often elusive, as recent events in a number of African countries, where the heads of state have explicitly requested the departure or the downsizing of UN missions, have demonstrated. This paper uses evidence from Côte d'Ivoire and Chad to explore the game of conflicting priorities and mutual dependency that underlines UN peacekeeping missions' relations with African host states. It argues that such a dynamic renders consent ambiguous and volatile. African leaders maximise possible benefits that they can obtain from a UN mission, while minimising the potential menace that ‘liberal peace’-style peace-building may pose to their rule. Withdrawal of consent may be facilitated when alternative ‘resources of extraversion’ become available, such as those provided by natural goods or by emerging commercial players. The current situation poses a difficult dilemma to the UN, balancing between keeping peacekeeping missions on the ground with limited or no consent, or leaving and risking breaking its implicit engagements with the civilian population.

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