Implementing and testing risk-preference-induction mechanisms in experimental sealed-bid auctionsThomas A. Rietz1993-10-01articleJournal of Risk and Uncertainty39 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsAuction Theory and ApplicationsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 39 citations exist upstream.References1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS1979Game-theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining.1988Theory and individual behavior of first-price auctions1981Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions1986Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange2016Experimental Development of Sealed-Bid Auction Theory; Calibrating Controls for Risk Aversion1990Inducing risk-neutral preferences: An examination in a controlled market environmentCited by2012Incentives and compensation schemes: An experimental study2012The “play-out” effect and preference reversals: Evidence for noisy maximization2012Decision under Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity: Theory and Experiments2005Risk aversion on probabilities : Experimental evidence of deciding between lotteries2011DO BINARY LOTTERY PAYOFFS MEASURE DEVIATIONS FROM EXPECTED UTILITY?- An Experimental Study by2008Sunk cost accounting and entrapment in corporate acquisitions and financial markets : an experimental analysis