Article1983

Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission

1,432 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Regulation and Compliance Studies Merger and Competition Analysis Legal and Constitutional Studies

Abstract

This paper extends Stigler and Peltzman's approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature. The model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications. The paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior. The first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion; the second assumes that Congress controls agency decisions. The recent behavior of the Federal Trade Commission provides the empirical setting. Substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model, including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over FTC decisions.

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References

1972Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

Cited by

1993Legislative leviathan: party government in the House 1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control 1999The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations 1984The New Economics of Organization 1988The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets 1997Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community 1985The Political Economy of Federalism 1997From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance

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