Anti-realism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy*

Berit “Brit” Brogaard · Joe Salerno

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Study and Philosophy of Religion Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

In his presidential address to the APA, ''How to be an Anti-realist'' (1982, 64-66), Alvin Plantinga argues that the only sensible way to be an antirealist is to be a theist. 1 Anti-realism (AR) in this context is the epistemic analysis of truth that says, (AR) necessarily, a statement is true if and only if it would be believed by an ideally [or sufficiently] rational agent/community in ideal [or sufficiently good] epistemic circumstances.

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References

1978The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy 2001On being in a quandary. Relativism vagueness logical revisionism 1982How to be an Anti-Realist 2000Fitch's proof, verificationism, and the knower paradox

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2009Beyond the Limits of Knowledge 2009Fitch's Paradox of Knowability 2009Revamping the Restriction Strategy 2007Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

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