Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages

1980-06-01articleJournal of Political Economy637 citationsclosed

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Employment, Labor, and Gender Studies Economic theories and models

Abstract

Models of a heterogeneous labor market are presented in which a worker's acceptance wage is an increasing function of his ability, and in which firms have imprecise information concerning the labor endowment of particular workers.Because the expected labor endowment of a hiree is an increasing function of the firm's wage offer, industrial firms may choose not to lower wages when confronted with a queue of job applicants. Rejected job applicants will not be able to increase their probability of employment by lowering their acceptance wages. Firms may choose to simultaneously hire and fire workers.

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 637 citations exist upstream.

References

1975Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria

1959Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth.

1974Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in LDC's: The Labor Turnover Model

Cited by

1986Does Better Nutrition Raise Farm Productivity?

1983Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets

1984Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

1997The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms

2018Adverse Selection in the Labor Market

2013DO BETTER PAID POLITICIANS PERFORM BETTER? DISENTANGLING INCENTIVES FROM SELECTION

2014Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets

2005Unemployment