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On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
12 references·3 citing·33 second hop
On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering (1989)On the extension of preferences over a se…On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives (1984)On some axioms for ranking se…Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach (1984)Extending an order on a Set t…An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set (1984)An axiomatic characterization…A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set (1984)A note on the extension of an…Aggregation and revelation of preferences (1979)Aggregation and revelation of…Strategy and group choice (1978)Strategy and group choiceThe Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance (1977)The Manipulation of Social Ch…Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness (1977)Strategy-Proofness and Social…Manipulation of social decision functions (1977)Manipulation of social decisi…Collective choice and social welfare (1977)Collective choice and social …Manipulation of social choice functions (1976)Manipulation of social choice…Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Collective Choice and Social …Continuous Extensions of an Order on a Set to the Power Set (1996)Continuous Extensions of an O…Binary interactions and subset choice (1996)Binary interactions and subse…Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings (1992)Strategy-proofness of social …COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY (2006)Automated Search for Impossibility Theorems in Social Choice Theory: Ranking Sets of Objects (2011)Functionings and Capabilities (2011)Games and Decisions (2015)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Rights, Games and Social Choice (1981)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized (2000)A theory of justice original edition (1971)A Theory of Justice (1971)Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons (1988)Equitable Opportunities: An Axiomatic Approach (1996)Preference relations (1979)The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation (1985)Achievements, capabilities and the concept of well-being (1987)Freedom of choice (1993)Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics (1979)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Ranking Sets of Objects (2004)Human Rights and Capabilities (2005)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)Political Institutions (2001)Political institutions: democracy and social choice (2002)Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences (2001)Strategyproof Social Choice (2011)Choice functions, “rationality” conditions, and variations on the weak axiom of revealed preference (1976)Weak path independence (1977)Fuzzy preferences and social choice (1987)The Moral Standing of the Market (1985)ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION AND SOCIAL CHOICE: CONTINGENT VALUATION AND THE MARKET ANALOGY (1995)Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1972Collective Choice and Social Welfare2,565 cited
  • 1979Aggregation and revelation of preferences430 cited
  • 1976Manipulation of social choice functions226 cited
  • 1984A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set166 cited
  • 1977Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness164 cited
  • 1977The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance141 cited
  • 1978Strategy and group choice139 cited
  • 1977Collective choice and social welfare94 cited
  • 1984An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set80 cited
  • 1984Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach77 cited
  • 1977Manipulation of social decision functions74 cited
  • 1984On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives66 cited

Cited by

  • 1996Binary interactions and subset choice52 cited
  • 1992Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings52 cited
  • 1996Continuous Extensions of an Order on a Set to the Power Set

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51 cited