Executive Encroachments on the Independence of the Commonwealth Auditor‐General

Abstract

Until recently Commonwealth governments have been able to have very extensive executive intrusions in public sector audit accepted largely as benign and untainted by political interests, thereby maintaining an illusion of an unfettered, autonomous public sector audit function. An interpretation of independence has been embedded which has been at odds with the operational reality. A conditional form of independence has been promoted as substantive independence and has thereby created multiple and often conflicting beliefs about what is and what ought to be the nature of independence in public sector audit. Differences in the independence of the person of the auditor‐general have been confused with the independence of the office.

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