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The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed
8 references·1 citing·39 second hop
The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed (2000)The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insur…Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data (1997)Empirical contract theory: Th…Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets (1996)Adverse selection with endoge…The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values (1992)The Principal-Agent Relations…Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey (1992)Adverse Selection in Insuranc…The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)The Theory of Industrial Orga…Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Signaling Games and Stable Eq…Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market (1977)Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing …Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Equilibrium in Competitive In…Misselling through Agents (2009)Misselling through AgentsThe Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity (1978)Information, trade and common knowledge (1982)The value of genetic information in the life insurance market (2000)The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements (2001)The Theory of Risk Classification (2013)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation (1976)Market Segmentation, Self-Selection, and Product Line Design (1984)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics (2002)Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts (1986)Econometrics of First-Price Auctions (1995)Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data (1999)Volunteer Labour Supply: the role of workers’ motivations (2004)Heterogeneity, Demand for Insurance, and Adverse Selection (2017)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality (1981)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Biological signals as handicaps (1990)Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (2003)Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Higher education as a filter (1973)Job Market Signaling (1973)INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (1977)Understanding and Mitigating Uncertainty in Online Exchange Relationships: A Principal–Agent Perspective1 (2007)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)The Role of Insurance in Managing Extreme Events: Implications for Terrorism Coverage (2002)Assessing, Managing, and Financing Extreme Events: Dealing with Terrorism (2003)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)The Credit Ratings Game (2009)How Does Household Portfolio Diversification Vary with Financial Literacy and Financial Advice? (2011)Money Doctors (2014)A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction (1990)A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction (1992)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1988The Theory of Industrial Organization8,651 cited
  • 1976Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information5,032 cited
  • 1987Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria3,227 cited
  • 1992The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values485 cited
  • 1977Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market449 cited
  • 1996Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets124 cited
  • 1997Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data100 cited
  • 1992Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey64 cited

Cited by

  • 2009Misselling through Agents386 cited

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