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Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
11 references·4 citing·36 second hop
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation (2010)Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment…Regret bounds for sleeping experts and bandits (2010)Regret bounds for sleeping ex…The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions (2009)The price of truthfulness for…Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms (2009)Characterizing truthful multi…Minimax policies for adversarial and stochastic bandits (2004)Minimax policies for adversar…An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents (2004)An Approximate Truthful Mecha…The Nonstochastic Multiarmed Bandit Problem (2002)The Nonstochastic Multiarmed …Finite-time Analysis of the Multiarmed Bandit Problem (2002)Finite-time Analysis of the M…Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents (2001)Truthful mechanisms for one-p…Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Algorithmic Mechanism DesignAlgorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract) (1999)Algorithmic mechanism design …Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignSponsored Search Auctions (2015)Sponsored Search AuctionsDynamic Pricing with Limited Supply (2015)Dynamic Pricing with Limited …Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Mechanism Design and Approxim…Learning and incentives in user-generated content (2013)Learning and incentives in us…Prediction, Learning, and Games (2006)UCB revisited: Improved regret bounds for the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem (2010)Combinatorial bandits (2012)Further Optimal Regret Bounds for Thompson Sampling (2012)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Frugal Path Mechanisms (2002)Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design (2004)On the Hardness of Being Truthful (2008)Some aspects of the sequential design of experiments (1952)Mortal Multi-Armed Bandits (2008)An Asymptotically Optimal Bandit Algorithm for Bounded Support Models. (2010)Multi-armed bandits with application to 5G small cells (2016)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2004)Worst-case equilibria (2009)A Decision-Theoretic Generalization of On-Line Learning and an Application to Boosting (1997)Online Learning and Online Convex Optimization (2011)Online Learning and Online Convex Optimization (2012)Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems (2012)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)Complexity of Mechanism Design (2002)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Information-Theoretic Regret Bounds for Gaussian Process Optimization in the Bandit Setting (2012)Making the Most of Your Samples (2015)Ironing in the Dark (2016)Simple versus Optimal Contracts (2019)
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  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2002The Nonstochastic Multiarmed Bandit Problem2,210 cited
  • 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design1,331 cited
  • 2001Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents521 cited
  • 1999Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)478 cited
  • 2004Minimax policies for adversarial and stochastic bandits330 cited
  • 2010Regret bounds for sleeping experts and bandits200 cited
  • 2004An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents150 cited
  • 2009The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions116 cited
  • 2009Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms89 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Mechanism Design and Approximation119 cited
  • 2015Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply68 cited
  • 2015Sponsored Search Auctions39 cited
  • 2013Learning and incentives in user-generated content38 cited

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