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Smoothing Techniques for Computing Nash Equilibria of Sequential Games
3 references·7 citing·27 second hop
Smoothing Techniques for Computing Nash Equilibria of Sequential Games (2010)Smoothing Techniques for Computing Nash E…Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games (1996)Efficient Computation of Equi…Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies (1996)Efficient Computation of Beha…A Course in Game Theory (1994)A Course in Game TheoryDynamic Thresholding and Pruning for Regret Minimization (2017)Dynamic Thresholding and Prun…Combining Compact Representation and Incremental Generation in Large Games with Sequential Strategies (2015)Combining Compact Representat…Near-optimal no-regret algorithms for zero-sum games (2014)Near-optimal no-regret algori…An Exact Double-Oracle Algorithm for Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information (2014)An Exact Double-Oracle Algori…Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types (2012)Computing pure Bayesian-Nash …First-order algorithm with $${\mathcal{O}({\rm ln}(1{/}\epsilon))}$$ convergence for $${\epsilon}$$ -equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games (2010)First-order algorithm with $$…First-order algorithm with O(ln(1/ε )) convergence for ε -equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games (2008)First-order algorithm with O(…The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1945)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form (1992)Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games (1964)Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations (1989)Complexity of Mechanism Design (2002)New complexity results about Nash equilibria (2008)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Sequential Equilibria (1982)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS (1988)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)Non-cooperative games (1989)Chapter 2 Computation of equilibria in finite games (1996)Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems (1997)Approximate Solutions for Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs (2004)Potential Games (1996)Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (2003)Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks (2021)Two-Person Zero-Sum Games for Network Interdiction (1995)A Decision-Theoretic Generalization of On-Line Learning and an Application to Boosting (1997)A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (2000)Prediction, Learning, and Games (2006)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1994A Course in Game Theory5,468 cited
  • 1996Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games228 cited
  • 1996Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies199 cited

Cited by

  • 2014An Exact Double-Oracle Algorithm for Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information78 cited
  • 2012Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types50 cited
  • 2014Near-optimal no-regret algorithms for zero-sum games43 cited
  • 2017Dynamic Thresholding and Pruning for Regret Minimization39 cited
  • 2008First-order algorithm with O(ln(1/ε )) convergence for ε -equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games32 cited
  • 2010First-order algorithm with $${\mathcal{O}({\rm ln}(1{/}\epsilon))}$$ convergence for $${\epsilon}$$ -equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games30 cited
  • 2015Combining Compact Representation and Incremental Generation in Large Games with Sequential Strategies30 cited

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