Computational Models as Aids to Better Reasoning in Psychology

Abstract

Scientists can reason about natural systems, including the mind and brain, in many ways, with each form of reasoning being associated with its own set of limitations. The limitations on human reasoning imply that the process of reasoning about theories and communicating those theories will be error prone; we must therefore be concerned about the reproducibility of theories whose very nature is shaped by constraints on human reasoning. The problem of reproducibility can be alleviated by computational modeling, which maximizes correspondence between the actual behavior of a posited system and its behavior inferred through reasoning and increases the fidelity of communication of our theories to others.

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