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A Wrong Turn to Reasons?
16 references·2 citing·33 second hop
A Wrong Turn to Reasons? (2011)A Wrong Turn to Reasons?The Conception of Intrinsic Value (2014)The Conception of Intrinsic V…Ontological Dependence (2014)Ontological DependenceSelf-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity (2009)Self-constitution: agency, id…Necessity and Triviality (2009)Necessity and TrivialityConstructivism about Reasons (2008)Constructivism about ReasonsResisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value (2006)Resisting the Buck-Passing Ac…Defending moral particularism (2006)Defending moral particularismValue, Reality, and Desire (2005)Value, Reality, and DesireEthics Without Principles (2005)Ethics Without PrinciplesReasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh (2002)Reasons, Responsibility, and …Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties (2002)Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Prope…Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? (2002)Does Moral Philosophy Rest on…Value, Respect, and Attachment (2001)Value, Respect, and AttachmentThe Possibility of Practical Reason (2000)The Possibility of Practical …Putting rationality in its place (1993)Putting rationality in its pl…Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1986)Ethics and the Limits of Phil…Who’s on First? (2020)Who’s on First?Semantics for Reasons (2019)Semantics for ReasonsLaws of Nature (1977)New work for a theory of universals (1983)The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it (2009)What makes pains unpleasant? (2012)The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism (2014)Individualism and the Mental (1979)Situations and Attitudes (1981)What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?* (2010)Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls’ Political Liberalism Versus Gaus’ Justificatory Liberalism (2013)An early-emerging explanatory heuristic promotes support for the status quo. (2015)Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception (2016)The Importance of Being Rational (2018)Reasons First (2021)Shifting Paradigms for Sustainable Development: Implications for Management Theory and Research (1995)From Metaphysics to Ethics (2000)A better best system account of lawhood (2009)Motivation and Agency (2003)The Nature of Normativity (2007)Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts (2009)Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties (1983)Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule-consequentialism (1996)Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (2007)EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY AND DOXASTIC AGENCY (2013)Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being? (2017)IN DEFENSE OF FUTURE TUESDAY INDIFFERENCE: IDEALLY COHERENT ECCENTRICS AND THE CONTINGENCY OF WHAT MATTERS (2009)Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity? (2018)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action (2006)The Subject of Virtue: An Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom (2013)On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models (2021)Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice (2005)A Theory of Political Obligation (2006)The SAGE Handbook of Current Developments in Grounded Theory (2019)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2000The Possibility of Practical Reason1,248 cited
  • 2009Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity1,118 cited
  • 2005Ethics Without Principles672 cited
  • 1986Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy542 cited
  • 2001Value, Respect, and Attachment486 cited
  • 2005Value, Reality, and Desire415 cited
  • 2008Constructivism about Reasons331 cited
  • 2002Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?269 cited
  • 1993Putting rationality in its place152 cited
  • 2002Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties111 cited
  • 2014Ontological Dependence94 cited
  • 2006Defending moral particularism58 cited
  • 2009Necessity and Triviality51 cited
  • 2002Reasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh51 cited
  • 2006Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value50 cited
  • 2014The Conception of Intrinsic Value48 cited

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  • 2020Who’s on First?21 cited

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  • 2019Semantics for Reasons20 cited