Designing Multi‐unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent‐based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions

Abstract

Multi‐unit auctions are being used by public agencies to allocate resources and to purchase services. These auctions resolve the lumpy bid problem inherent in single‐bid auctions by allowing bidders to submit a supply or demand schedule. However, the choice of pricing formats for multi‐unit auctions is controversial. Neither economic theory nor laboratory experiments depict a complete picture of how alternative pricing formats perform in terms of budgetary or allocative efficiency. This paper constructs an agent‐based computational model to compare uniform, discriminatory and generalised Vickrey pricing formats under different degrees of competition and heterogeneity in the bidder population.

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