On the origin and rise of central bank independence in West Germany

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified. JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50

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