As reformers have sought to improve the academic performance of public schools in the United States, they have employed widely varying strategies. Recently, several states have combined two of these strategies to improve the academic performance of schools: performance indicators and accountability. In this article, we examine the high-stakes use of educational indicators to hold schools accountable for the academic performance of their students. Drawing chiefly on examples from California’s Public Schools Accountability Act of 1999 (PSAA), we examine the assumptions on which this strategy is based, revealing a quasi-market rationale. Then, we place the assumptions against the literature on the use of educational indicators to identify issues that might arise with implementation, uncovering fundamental tensions that could undermine the intended consequences of holding schools accountable for attaining specific levels on performance indicators.
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