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Executive stock options and incentive effects due to systematic risk · Study

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ArticleExecutive stock options and incentive effects due to systematic risk

Jin‐Chuan Duan2004

Article2004

Executive stock options and incentive effects due to systematic risk

Jin‐Chuan Duan · Jason Zhanshun Wei

65 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Banking & Finance

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Corporate Finance and Governance Stochastic processes and financial applications Risk Management in Financial Firms

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities 1998Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?1997Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?1995THE GARCH OPTION PRICING MODEL 1999The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation 2000A Closed-Form GARCH Option Valuation Model 1991Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation

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2015The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios 2011Leverage, executive incentives and corporate governance 2022Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Differentiation 2013The Effect of Executive Stock Options on Corporate Innovative Activities 2015Does bonus deferral reduce risk-taking?

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2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.chapter · 12 shared references 2004Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay‐to‐Performance Sensitivitiesarticle · 12 shared references 2000Stock Options for Undiversified Executivespreprint · 10 shared references 2001Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?report · 10 shared references 2002Managing Option Fragilityreport · 10 shared references 2003Compensation for managers with career concerns: the role of stock options in optimal contractsarticle · 10 shared references

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Year2004

Typearticle

Published2004-06-28

VenueJournal of Banking & Finance

ISSN-L0378-4266

Languageen

Citations65

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.05.031

openalex_workW1982307869

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