The Power to Punish: Discretion and Sentencing Reform in the War on Drugs

Abstract

This article addresses whether and how organizational processes and the exercise of discretion affect the relationship between sentencing reforms and sentencing outcomes. Organizational perspectives are drawn upon to develop competing hypotheses regarding courts' adaptations to and implementation of reforms under sentencing guidelines. To test these hypotheses, changes in the charging and sentencing of drug offenders in Washington State from 1986 to 1995 are examined following a series of sentencing reforms. The findings suggest that changes to the sentencing laws have resulted in adaptations by courtroom workgroups that are consistent with an organizational efficiency model of criminal justice.

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