Product market competition and corporate governance

Abstract

This paper investigates whether product market competition acts as an external mechanism for disciplining management and also whether there is any relationship between the degree of competition a firm faces and its corporate governance. We find that firms in competitive industries or with low market power tend to have weak corporate governance structures. Results are robust to various competition measures at firm and industry levels, even after controlling for firm-specific variables. We further find that corporate governance quality has a significant effect on performance only when product market competition is weak. The overall evidence suggests that product market competition has a substantial impact on corporate governance and that it substitutes for corporate governance quality. Finally, we provide evidence that the disciplinary force of competition on management is from the fear of liquidation.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 113 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.