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Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondence
10 references·8 citing·43 second hop
Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondence (1988)Covering sets and a new condorcet choice …Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice (1986)Covering, Dominance, and Inst…Choosing from a tournament (1986)Choosing from a tournamentSophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control (1985)Sophisticated voting outcomes…A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting (1980)A New Solution Set for Tourna…Aggregation and revelation of preferences (1979)Aggregation and revelation of…Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting (1977)Graph-Theoretical Approaches …Condorcet Social Choice Functions (1977)Condorcet Social Choice Funct…Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate (1973)Aggregation of Preferences wi…Choice Functions and Revealed Preference (1971)Choice Functions and Revealed…Inconsistencies in a Schedule of Paired Comparisons (1961)Inconsistencies in a Schedule…Normative Uncertainty and Social Choice (2018)Normative Uncertainty and Soc…An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments (2009)An updated survey on the line…A Model of Farsighted Voting (2008)A Model of Farsighted VotingA survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments (2007)A survey on the linear orderi…Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections (2002)Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equ…The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences (2001)The Strong No Show Paradoxes …Comparison functions and choice correspondences (1999)Comparison functions and choi…Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution (1990)Cyclic tournaments and cooper…Social Choice and Individual Values (1952)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election (1989)Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination (1956)Rational Choice Functions and Orderings (1959)Valuing Freedoms (2002)Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (2011)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule (1967)Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control (1976)Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models (1979)A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice (2000)Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models (2000)Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States (2003)Theory of voting (1969)Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination (1977)Choice functions over a finite set: A summary (1985)Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures (2001)Computational Social Choice (2012)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision (1952)On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis (1977)On measuring the quality of life (1992)A Theory of Voting Equilibria (1993)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)The Uncovered Set and the Core (1987)Spatial Models of Legislative Choice (1988)The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games (1988)General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models (1979)Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote (1994)Chapter 4 Voting procedures (2002)A Text-book of Experimental Psychology (1909)A NEW MEASURE OF RANK CORRELATION (1938)Rank Correlation Methods. (1957)Ranking from Unbalanced Paired-Comparison Data (1987)Evaluation and Decision Models: a Critical Perspective (2002)Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016)Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics (1979)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Ranking Sets of Objects (2004)Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions (1984)How hard is it to control an election? (1992)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1971Choice Functions and Revealed Preference775 cited
  • 1977Condorcet Social Choice Functions567 cited
  • 1973Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate496 cited
  • 1980A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting481 cited
  • 1986Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice459 cited
  • 1979Aggregation and revelation of preferences430 cited
  • 1961Inconsistencies in a Schedule of Paired Comparisons312 cited
  • 1985Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control290 cited
  • 1986Choosing from a tournament228 cited
  • 1977Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting156 cited

Cited by

  • 1999Comparison functions and choice correspondences110 cited
  • 2008A Model of Farsighted Voting102 cited
  • 2002Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections95 cited
  • 1990Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution94 cited
  • 2001The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences82 cited

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2007
A survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
75 cited
  • 2009An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments67 cited
  • 2018Normative Uncertainty and Social Choice23 cited