Principal–principal–agency relationships and the role of external governance

Damian Ward · Igor V. Filatotchev

55 citations0/0 files storedManagerial and Decision Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Insurance and Financial Risk Management

Abstract

Abstract This paper explores agency problems associated with mutual and joint stock organizational forms. It examines whether the independent mode of distribution acts as a governance factor that reduces principal–agent and principal–principal costs. By analyzing a 1990–1997 panel of life insurance companies this paper provides evidence that mutuals have higher principal–agent costs, but lower principal–principal costs, compared with stocks. Independent distribution mitigates both agency problems by reducing managerial expenses while safeguarding interests of policyholders. These relationships are positively moderated by product complexity and free cash flow. This is consistent with the assumption that companies that use independent agents exhibit lower levels of manager and shareholder opportunism. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 55 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1991Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations 1998Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models 1983Separation of Ownership and Control 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance 2021Econometric Analysis of Panel Data 1995Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models

Cited by

2017Ownership structure and internationalization of Indian firms 2022Type I and type II agency conflicts in family firms: An empirical investigation 2010Reactivity and Passivity After Enforcement Actions: Better Late Than Never 2011Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms: A case study in New Zealand unlisted small companies 2018Are All Private Benefits of Control Ineffective? Principal–Principal Benefits, External Governance Quality, and Firm Performance

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.