Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea

Abstract

Nonproliferation in the 1990s and beyond will be an enormously difficult challenge. In large part this is true because the only road map for such efforts merely points us in a general direction. The lay of the land, its contours and pathways, the barriers to progress and the bridges over them will only become apparent when we lay that map over a specific case. And once apparent, they will show a geopolitical topography that is maddeningly complex. In particular, the long-term success of the October 1994 North Korean-U.S. nuclear deal is by no means guaranteed. The agreement calls for the sort of nuanced, patient engagement of the North that the United States and its allies have so far proven incapable of conducting. Already, one major step toward a resolution of the nuclear issue has fallen victim to failed implementation: the process that was underway in 1992, when North Korea accepted inspections only to see U.S.-South Korean diplomacy collapse during the second half of the year. What the Agreed Framework will mean for the future is not completely clear, but this much is certain: if the United States stamps the Korean nuclear issue {open_quotes}solved{close_quotes} and turns to other crises, the agreementmore » will collapse. Only by a continuous and energetic follow-up process of engagement and reconciliation with North Korea can the United States and its allies make this deal stick. 47 refs.« less

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