Congressional Parties, Fundraising, and Committee Ambition

Abstract

Congressional party leaders are hypothesized to use desirable committee assignments as a selective incentive to entice incumbent members of Congress to contribute the collective good of the party’s campaign efforts. Financial contributions to the party are an effective measure of party loyalty, particularly in an era of high levels of party loyalty on roll call votes. This article analyzes committee transfers in the U.S. Congress from the 102nd through the 107th Congresses. The evidence shows that the greater the amount an incumbent contributes to party committees or party candidates, the more likely he or she will transfer to prestige committees. It also demonstrates that fundraising has become more closely related to prestige committee transfers when margins of party control in the House became very close after the Republican takeover.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 47 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.