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Fault Tolerant Implementation
6 references·13 citing·47 second hopsampled
Fault Tolerant Implementation (2002)Fault Tolerant ImplementationImplementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information (2008)Implementation, contracts, an…Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality (1999)Nash Equilibrium and Welfare …Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities (1999)Multidimensional Mechanism De…Contracting with Externalities (1999)Contracting with ExternalitiesHow (not) to sell nuclear weapons (1996)How (not) to sell nuclear wea…The computational difficulty of manipulating an election (1989)The computational difficulty …Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting (2019)Robustness in Mechanism Desig…Level-$k$ Mechanism Design (2018)Level-$k$ Mechanism DesignMechanism design and intentions (2016)Mechanism design and intentio…A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents (2012)A Model of Persuasion with Bo…Robust Mechanism Design (2011)Robust Mechanism DesignCongestion games with malicious players (2009)Congestion games with malicio…Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators (2008)Lower Bounds on Implementing …Information in Mechanism Design (2008)Information in Mechanism Desi…Role of honesty in full implementation (2007)Role of honesty in full imple…Congestion games with malicious players (2007)Congestion games with malicio…The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2004)The Theory of Implementation …A computer scientist looks at game theory (2003)A computer scientist looks at…Chapter 5 Implementation theory (2002)Chapter 5 Implementation theo…Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)Naked Exclusion: Comment (2000)Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions (2005)Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure (2007)The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2024)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (1987)The Winner-Take-All Society (1996)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment (2007)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)On the joint use of liability and safety regulation (2000)An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions (2001)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election (1989)Single transferable vote resists strategic voting (1991)How hard is it to control an election? (1992)When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Deception: The Role of Consequences (2005)Promises and Partnership (2006)Implementation with evidence (2012)Assessing the Intention to Evade Fares for Demographic Segments of Passengers: Empirical Research in Italy for Building Smart(er) Cities (2021)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values (1989)Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers (2000)The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer (2000)The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2010)The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure (1954)Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003 (2005)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior (1989)Simple versus Optimal Contracts (2019)Salesforce Compensation and Two‐Sided Ambiguity: Robust Moral Hazard with Moment Information (2021)Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (2022)The Bargaining Problem (1950)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Fifty Years of the Nash Program 1953-2003 (2004)Strategyproof Social Choice (2011)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Contracts as Reference Points * (2008)Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare (2008)
this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

  • 1999Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality1,182 cited
  • 1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election530 cited
  • 1999Contracting with Externalities457 cited
  • 1996How (not) to sell nuclear weapons344 cited
  • 1999Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities297 cited
  • 2008Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information213 cited

Cited by

  • 2002Chapter 5 Implementation theory185 cited
  • 2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules103 cited
  • 2007Role of honesty in full implementation94 cited
  • 2019Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting89 cited
  • 2008Information in Mechanism Design75 cited
  • 2011Robust Mechanism Design74 cited
  • 2007Congestion games with malicious players69 cited
  • 2008Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators62 cited
  • 2003A computer scientist looks at game theory54 cited
  • 2016Mechanism design and intentions47 cited

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  • 2012A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents41 cited
  • 2018Level-$k$ Mechanism Design41 cited
  • 2009Congestion games with malicious players34 cited