SStudyAcademic Library

Dashboard Shelves Open access My library Review

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion · Study

ArticleShelves

ArticleFull revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion

Jérôme Mathis2008

Article2008

Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion

Jérôme Mathis

57 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

No abstract was published for this record.

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 57 citations exist upstream.

References

1982Strategic Information Transmission 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications 1981The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality 1986Relying on the Information of Interested Parties 1980Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids 2005Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting Services 1990Strategic Information Revelation 1985Quality Testing and Disclosure

Cited by

2006Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence 2016Disclosure of endogenous information

Details

Year2008

Typearticle

Published2008-05-18

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations57

Files0 public / 0

ShelfGame Theory and Applications

Identifiers

doi10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002

openalex_workW1985238910

Links

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.