On the Rational Reconstruction of our Theoretical Knowledge

Abstract

This paper concerns the rational reconstruction of physical theories initially advanced by F. P. Ramsey and later elaborated by Rudolf Carnap. The Carnap–Ramsey reconstruction of theoretical knowledge is a natural development of classical empiricist ideas, one that is informed by Russell's philosophical logic and his theories of propositional understanding and knowledge of matter; as such, it is not merely a schematic representation of the notion of an empirical theory, but the backbone of a general account of our knowledge of the physical world. Carnap–Ramsey is an illuminating approach to epistemological problems that remain with us, one whose difficulties are shared by accounts that have sought to replace it. 1Introduction 2Russell's theory of propositional understanding 3Ramsey's primary and secondary systems 4Carnap's reconstruction of the language of science and an observation of Newman 5Extension of the foregoing to constructive empiricism 6Putnam's model‐theoretic argument and the semantic view of theories 7The problem clarified and resolved

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