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Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm
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Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm (2008)Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points…Contracts as Reference Points * (2008)Contracts as Reference Points…Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence (2007)Vertical Integration and Firm…Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? (2005)Four formal(izable) theories …Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts (2001)Incentives versus Transaction…What Determines Firm Size? (1999)What Determines Firm Size?What Determines Firm Size? (1999)What Determines Firm Size?The Vertical Integration of Production Market Failure Considerations (1999)The Vertical Integration of P…Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts (1999)Incentives Versus Transaction…The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons (1997)The Proper Scope of Governmen…Financial Dependence and Growth (1996)Financial Dependence and Grow…The Firm as an Incentive System (1994)The Firm as an Incentive Syst…Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Property Rights and the Natur…The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Vertical Integration, Appropr…The Problem of Social Cost (1960)The Problem of Social CostThe Nature of the Firm (1937)The Nature of the FirmCorporate Governance Systems Diversity: A Coasian Perspective on Stakeholder Rights (2016)Corporate Governance Systems …Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm (2011)Thinking about the Firm: A Re…Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence (2009)Can Contracts Solve the Hold-…Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination (1984)The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization (1990)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks (2005)Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1966)Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed (1998)Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract (2002)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Unbundling Institutions (2005)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth (1992)Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes (2000)Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (2004)Law, finance, and economic growth in China (2005)The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)State versus Private Ownership (1998)The effects of government ownership on bank lending (2003)The New Comparative Economics (2003)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)The quality of government (1999)The Economics of Governance (2005)Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression (2010)
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References

  • 1937The Nature of the Firm23,826 cited
  • 1960The Problem of Social Cost18,243 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1996Financial Dependence and Growth8,055 cited
  • 1978Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process5,797 cited
  • 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
  • 1997The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons1,773 cited
  • 1999The Vertical Integration of Production Market Failure Considerations1,749 cited
  • 1994The Firm as an Incentive System1,348 cited
  • 2001Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts1,101 cited
  • 2007Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence712 cited
  • 2005Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?692 cited
  • 2008Contracts as Reference Points *690 cited
  • 1999What Determines Firm Size?309 cited
  • 1999What Determines Firm Size?250 cited
  • 1999Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts

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188 cited

Cited by

  • 2011Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm75 cited
  • 2009Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence17 cited
  • 2016Corporate Governance Systems Diversity: A Coasian Perspective on Stakeholder Rights14 cited